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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
Nos. 08-4800, 08-4801 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ERIC HAYES, a/k/a International Ross, a/k/a Ross 
 
                                         Eric Hayes, Appellant  
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal Nos. 1-05-cr-00443-009, 1-07-cr-00293-001) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Yvette Kane 
__________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 4, 2011 
 
BEFORE:  BARRY, HARDIMAN, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Filed:  June 29, 2011) 
 
__________ 
  
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge
 
. 
 Eric Hayes appeals his conviction by a jury for:  one count of conspiracy to 
transport individuals with intent to engage in prostitution, and intent to distribute the 
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proceeds of prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 2421 and 1952(a); two counts 
of coercing and enticing individuals to travel in interstate commerce for prostitution, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2422(a), and 1952(a)(3) and (2); and one count of 
transportation of an individual in interstate commerce with intent to engage in 
prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2421.  The District Court sentenced him to 420 
months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, assessments of $100 for each 
count, and a fine of $4,000 on Count One. 
 Quoting from Hayes’ brief, he asserts the following issues on appeal. 
I.  Does a proper view of the evidence reveal that Eric Hayes 
actually agreed with others to participate in illegal activity? 
 
II. Does the evidence reveal that [A.P.] chose of her own 
volition and without persuasion, coercion, inducement or 
enticement from Eric Hayes to cross state lines for purposes 
of engaging in prostitution? 
 
III. Was the effect of Dr. Sharon Cooper’s testimony so 
prejudicial that no efforts to limit the juries’ [sic] application 
of it could prevent undue prejudice and deprive Mr. Hayes of 
his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury? 
 
IV. Did the trial court incorrectly calculate the sentencing 
guidelines for Mr. Hayes and did the court deny Mr. Hayes 
his constitutional right against ex post facto application of 
those rights. 
 
Appellant’s Brief, p. 2.  We will affirm. 
 We apply a deferential standard in determining whether a jury verdict is supported 
by sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the government.  
We will sustain the verdict if any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of 
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 
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1998).  Hayes admits to being a pimp, and to interacting with other pimps who pleaded 
guilty to the conspiracy.  Nonetheless, he asserts that there is no substantial evidence that 
he entered into an agreement with any of these people to participate in any illegal 
activity.  The government presented evidence that Hayes had an informal agreement in 
which he exchanged advice and assistance with his “pimp partners.”  It was such 
information sharing that prompted Hayes and his “pimp partners”—almost all of whom 
were from Toledo, Ohio—to move their operations to a truck stop in Harrisburg, 
Pennsylvania.  Hayes and his “pimp partners” also set prices for prostitution services and 
enforced an unwritten code of conduct among the pimps.  We conclude that the 
government presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to decide that there was a 
meeting of the minds among Hayes and his co-conspirators. 
 Next, while Hayes does not dispute that he transported a minor (identified as A.P.) 
across state lines for the purpose of engaging in prostitution, he argues that he did not 
entice, induce, or coerce A.P. to travel with him.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(a).  Hayes 
supports his position by relying upon statements from A.P. that she chose to be a 
prostitute, was excited to travel with Hayes, and that her agreement to go to Las Vegas 
did not take any “arm-twisting.”  Hayes ignores evidence of A.P.’s youth and instability, 
that he encouraged A.P. to believe that she was his girlfriend (a scheme used by other co-
conspirators), and that he—within the context of this ruse—enticed A.P. to travel to Las 
Vegas with promises of riches and a good life.  Moreover, Hayes prostituted A.P. in other 
states and, throughout this time, he increased his control over her through isolation, 
threats, and brutality.  Although Hayes attempts to distinguish his abuse of A.P. from his 
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intent to continue prostituting her in various states, a reasonable jury could conclude that 
Hayes enticed and/or coerced A.P. to travel interstate for purposes of prostitution.   
 Hayes also asserts that the District Court abused its discretion in allowing the 
testimony of a government witness, Dr. Sharon Cooper, because it was unduly 
prejudicial.  Before trial, the District Court ruled that Dr. Cooper was qualified to testify 
on the general topic of the sexual exploitation of children, but she was not permitted to 
testify about specific victims in this case.  Hayes argues that Dr. Cooper’s testimony 
should have been completely excluded or, upon hearing the actual testimony, the District 
Court should have stricken it from the record.  Nothing in the trial transcript supports 
Hayes’ contention.  The District Court sustained Hayes’ objection to one question by the 
prosecution, and issued a proper curative instruction.  Beyond this, Dr. Cooper testified 
without objection from Hayes, staying within the parameters that the District Court 
established.  Moreover, the District Court gave Hayes opportunity to cross-examine Dr. 
Cooper.  We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion.  
 With regard to Hayes’ sentence, we are not persuaded by his argument that the 
cross-reference constituted an ex post facto violation.1
                                              
1 Hayes mistakenly references United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384 (3d Cir. 1994) in 
support of his argument.  However, Bertoli referred to separate counts of a conviction 
that spanned the effective date of new Guidelines, a scenario not present here. 
  The conduct for which Hayes was 
convicted included acts occurring after November 1, 2004, the effective date of relevant 
amendments to the Guidelines.  Both he and his co-conspirators were still prostituting 
victims in 2005, and the District Court reasonably concluded that the acts of Hayes’ co-
conspirators were foreseeable and attributable to him, given his relationship with his 
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“pimp partners.”  Therefore, the District Court properly applied to Hayes the Guidelines 
incorporating amendments that became effective after November 1, 2004, which 
permitted the cross-reference to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2A3.1 (2007).    
 We easily dispose of Hayes’ assertion that the District Court erred by applying a 
four-level special characteristic for conduct described in 18 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) or (b), 
pursuant to section 2A3.1(b)(1).  He avers that he did not force anyone to engage in 
sexual acts.  Hayes and his co-conspirators threatened and severely beat minors and 
young women to establish dominance over them for the purpose of prostituting them.  He 
and his co-conspirators created an environment of fear that forced their victims to 
continue to prostitute.  The District Court properly applied the enhancement for forcing 
an individual to engage in a sexual act.   
 His challenge to the two-level vulnerable victim enhancement, pursuant to section 
3A1.1(b)(1), also lacks merit.  Hayes recruited a cognitively impaired minor and 
prostituted a girl with a bi-polar disorder.  Moreover, testimony established that the 
conspiracy targeted “lost girls” (a reference to minors from troubled personal or familial 
circumstances such as homelessness or severely unstable families).  These conditions 
were not incidental to the victimization.  The record provides sufficient basis for the 
District Court’s application of the vulnerable victim enhancement.   
 With regard to Hayes’ challenge to the leader/organizer enhancement (section 
3B1.1(a)) the record provides evidence that he trained at least one other co-
conspirator/pimp in this large, multi-state operation.  The District Court did not err by 
applying this enhancement. 
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 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction 
and sentence.     
